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On 1 July 2016 the presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru celebrat-
ed the 11th Summit of the Pacific Alliance (PA) in Puerto Varas, Chile. The 
PA members quite successfully practise a kind of joint “nation-branding” 
to promote trade and investment and to enhance their international status 
and visibility. Since its formation in 2012 the PA has attracted the interest of 
states and business sectors around the world.
 • The PA is basically an economic strategic alliance designed to project and to 
promote the common interests of its member countries within Latin America 
and vis-à-vis the United States, Europe, and especially Asia. 
 • This explains why the PA is an organisation with many more observer states (49) 
than member states. These observer states include economic heavyweights such 
as Japan, China, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
as well as three of the five Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries and 
a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).
 • With its trade liberalisation agenda, the PA differentiates itself from other Lat-
in American regional organisations, such as Mercosur and ALBA, and brings a 
new dynamic to Latin American economic integration. Moreover, it has revived 
Mexico as an external actor in the South American regional subsystem.
 • From a geopolitical perspective, the PA strengthens the Pacific shift in South 
America and economic links with Asia. Furthermore, it offers the US govern-
ment new opportunities to promote its free trade agenda in Latin America at a 
time when Washington is showing renewed interest in Latin America.
Policy Implications
The four member countries of the PA “branded” themselves as gateways to Asia 
and as “good economies” compared to the “bad economies” of other more state-
oriented economies in Latin America. With the recent political shift to the right 
in the region, the PA may become more influential and thus more capable of 
advancing trade liberalisation in Latin America. Likewise, the European Union 
may obtain greater leverage in its relations with Latin America through its close 
cooperation and free trade agreements with the PA countries.
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The Pacific Alliance
On 6 June 2012 the presidents of Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico signed the Con-
stitutive Treaty for the Pacific Alliance (Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del Pacifico) in 
Antofagasta, Chile. As conditions for membership, the Pacific Alliance (PA) frame-
work agreement requires that PA member countries are democracies, comply with 
the rule of law, practise the separation of powers, respect human rights, and guaran-
tee fundamental liberties (article 2). As outlined in the various PA declarations, the 
primary goal of this new regional group is to build a zone of deep economic integra-
tion and progress towards the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. 
A supplementary agreement (Protocolo Adicional al Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza 
del Pacífico) that was signed in Cartagena in February 2014 and came into force in 
May 2016 specified that tariffs would be eliminated for 92 per cent of their mutual 
trade. The remaining 8 per cent of tariffs – which apply to politically sensitive sec-
tors such as agriculture, textiles, and garments – will gradually be removed over a 
period of three to seven years. For a small percentage of these products (which are 
considered sensitive products), this could take up to a maximum of 17 years.
Business associations and financial markets have been supportive of the new 
organisation from the beginning. A Deutsche Bank Research publication (2013) 
championed the PA countries as “Latin America’s new stars,” while the Bertelsmann 
Foundation referred to them as “the Pacific Pumas” (George 2014) and later called 
for a “Pacific Alliance 2.0” (Marczak and George 2016). The Economist called on 
other Latin American countries to “join the club” (29 April 2013), which an art icle 
in Money Week (2 April 2013) described as “a new Latin American superpower.” 
PA member countries (i) represent 37 per cent of the Latin American popula-
tion and 35 per cent of the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) (38 per cent at 
PPP), (ii) account for 46 per cent of Latin American exports and 50 per cent of im-
ports, and (iii) received 47 per cent Latin American foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in 2013 and 43 per cent in 2014 (Villareal 2016: 10). Accumulated GDP would make 
the PA the eighth most important economy in the world and the seventh largest 
exporter. However, the total figures for the PA are strongly influenced by Mexico, 
which accounts for 57 per cent of the PA population, 61 per cent of PA GDP, and 70 
per cent of PA exports (Villareal 2016: 9–10). Mexican exports to the United States 
alone account for more than 50 per cent of the total value of PA exports. From that 
perspective, the PA is Mexico plus Chile, Colombia, and Peru. 
The PA has had other achievements and has additional objectives. First, it inte-
grated the stock markets of Chile, Colombia, and Peru to create the Latin American 
Integrated Market (MILA) in 2011; Mexico joined MILA in 2014. (MILA, however, is 
still very much a work in progress.) Second, since the end of 2012, visas have no  longer 
been required for travel within the PA. Third, PA member countries have started to 
share diplomatic and consular representation abroad, with joint embassies now op-
erating in Ghana (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), in Vietnam (Colombia and 
Peru), in Morocco (Chile and Colombia), in Algeria (Chile and Colombia), in Azer-
baijan (Chile and Colombia), and at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in Paris (Chile and Colombia). Fourth, PA member states have 
started to coordinate trade and investment promotion activities (including joint pro-
motion agencies in third countries) in order present the alliance as an integrated eco-
nomic space. Fifth, the PA has established a joint student scholarship programme.
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Like most Latin American regional organisations, the PA has not created su-
pranational institutions. What is more, it has opted for a much leaner institutional 
structure than Mercosur or even UNASUR. The PA has no permanent secretariat or 
administrative body to support decision-making. The member states’ foreign min-
isters and trade ministers constitute the Council of Ministers, which holds ordinary 
meetings once a year and extraordinary meetings upon members’ requests. In line 
with the intergovernmental character of the group, Council of Ministers decisions 
must be unanimous. The PA presidency is pro tempore (one year) and rotates be-
tween member states in alphabetical order. The presidential summits are the su-
preme decision-making forums and are vital in moving the integration process 
forwards. Between April 2011 and July 2016, 12 summits were held, including a 
“virtual summit” by videoconference in March 2012.
The PA has also created additional internal institutions such as the Parliamen-
tary Monitoring Commission of the Pacific Alliance (Comisión de Seguimiento Par-
lamentario al Acuerdo de la Alianza del Pacífico) – which meets biannually and is 
composed of eight congress members from each member state who are appoint-
ed for a period of four years according to the rules of their national parliaments 
( Tvevad 2014: 9) – and the Business Council (Consejo Empresarial), which has the 
aim to engage the business sector with the PA. 
Although the PA has a lean structure, it is nevertheless quite dynamic in regard 
to joint activities. For example, besides other consultations, in 2015 it organised five 
meetings of the so-called High Level Group (Grupo de Alto Nivel), which is com-
posed of the vice ministers of trade and foreign affairs and is responsible for over-
seeing the progress of technical groups. These technical groups had three meetings 
in 2015. Meanwhile, the Council of Ministers met twice; the ministers of finance, 
three times; and the ministers of culture, once (Alianza del Pacifico 2015). 
Few Members, Many Observers 
The PA is, in principle, open to integrating more members. However, full member-
ships will only be granted to candidates that already have a free trade agreement 
(FTA) in place with each PA member state, which was the case with regard to the 
four founding members. On this basis, Costa Rica applied for full membership in 
February 2014 when President Laura Chinchilla signed a declaration of intention – 
though the process has become protracted. Panama became a candidate for full 
membership after the government signed an FTA with Mexico in April 2014, though 
the ratification of its FTA with Colombia has been delayed due to an ongoing dis-
pute between both countries before the World Trade Organization. 
Thus as of July 2016 the PA only had four full members, two observer state 
candidates, and 47 observer states. It is one of the few international organisations 
where observer states clearly outnumber member states. With regard to geographi-
cal distribution, there are 10 observer states in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(plus two observer state candidates), 2 in North America (Canada and the United 
States), 9 in Asia-Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand), and 22 in Europe 
(including Ukraine and Georgia), 2 in North Africa (Morocco and Egypt), and 2 in 
the Middle East (Israel and Turkey). The PA is of special interest for European 
investors and governments because the European Union has signed FTAs with all 
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founding members of the PA as well as with Costa Rica and Panama. The intention 
to cooperate with the PA can be seen as a sign of confidence in the new organisation. 
Even three Mercosur countries (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and one ALBA 
country (Ecuador) have successfully applied for observer status.
Moreover, the PA has also entered into dialogue with other regional organisa-
tions such as Mercosur, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
The high number of observers can be interpreted as an indicator of success be-
cause it demonstrates the importance other states attach to the PA. However, it 
also confronts the PA with the challenge to take advantage of this interest and to 
engage with its observer states. Otherwise, there is a risk that observer status will 
become merely symbolic. There is also the possibility that observers may lose inter-
est in the PA. Thus, perhaps it will be necessary to differentiate between observer 
state categories and to develop different cooperation mechanisms (Marczak and 
George 2016). The PA is reacting to this challenge and intends to structure dialogue 
and cooperation with observer states along four thematic axes: education; science, 
technology, and innovation; internationalisation of small and medium-sized enter-
prises; and trade facilitation. Moreover, a first PA cooperation forum with observer 
states is in the making. 
Limited Intraregional Trade
Trade between PA member states has not significantly increased since the alliance 
was created. In 2014 PA intraexports (as percentage of total exports) varied be-
tween 9.1 per cent in the case of Peru and 2.1 per cent in the case of Mexico; this is 
not really surprising due to the heavy dependency of Mexican trade on the United 
States. From 2012 to 2014 only Peru’s PA exports (as a percentage of total exports) 
increased; in the other three countries they stagnated or decreased. Intrabloc trade 
(exports) would slightly increase from 5.6 per cent to 8.6 per cent by including 
Costa Rica and Panama in the PA. 
In the PA it is not only member state trade patterns that vary; the expectations 
among business people also differ. In a survey of 120 businesspeople from Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, and Mexico published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) expec-
Status Countries
Full Member 2012: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru
Observer 2012: Costa Rica, Panama (candidates for full membership)
2012: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Uruguay
2013: Guatemala, Japan, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
France, Honduras, Paraguay, Portugal, China, South Korea, Turkey, United 
States, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom
2014: Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Singapore, Belgium, Trinidad and 
Tobago
2015: Indonesia, Thailand, Georgia, Austria, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, 
Hungary, Poland, Haiti
2016: Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, Egypt, Ukraine, Argentina, 
Romania
Table 1.  
Members and  
Observers of the  
Pacific Alliance
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tations with regard to the PA were high in Colombia and Peru, more measured in 
Mexico, and less enthusiastic in Chile. Moreover, opinions on which industries were 
the most attractive for investment varied greatly in the four countries (though there 
was a certain consensus with respect to energy), reflecting differences between the 
economies of the PA countries.
The absence of economic complementarities between the member countries is 
an obstacle to increasing trade within the PA. Moreover, geographical distance and 
inadequate transport infrastructures constitute another barrier to increased trade 
or the creation of intraregional value chains. Thus, the declared objective of the free 
movement of services and capital might prove more important than growth in the 
intraregional trade in goods (Tvevad 2014: 14). And the PA may reinforce member 
countries’ positions in third markets but not necessarily in Latin America. Com-
pared with the Mercosur countries, only a modest share of PA member countries’ 
exports are to Latin America.
The Pacific Alliance and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
On 4 February 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand, 12 Pacific Rim countries signed 
a broad trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – though it 
still needs to be ratified by the respective national parliaments. Among the sig-
natory countries, which account for almost 40 per cent of world GDP, are three 
members of the Pacific Alliance: Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The other signatories are 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, the 
United States, and Vietnam. Given the number of APEC countries involved in the 
TPP negotiations, the United States sees the TPP as an alternative way to achieve 
the un realised APEC goals regarding free and open trade and investment for indus-
trialised countries in 2010 and for developing economies in 2020, which were set in 
Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994 (Dade and Meacham 2013; Gateway House 2013).
The only PA country not participating is Colombia, but it might be invited to 
join later. The Colombian government had asked to participate in the negotiations 
back in 2014, but the TPP negotiations were limited to APEC members. Chile was 
from the beginning one of the drivers behind the TPP. In one respect, the TPP 
agreement is the continuation, expansion, and deepening of the Transpacific Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement, which was signed by Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and 
New Zealand in 2005 and entered into force in 2006. This agreement contained 
an accession clause for other countries. TPP negotiations started in 2008 and saw 
some contentious  issues arise in regard to intellectual property rights (e.g. generic 
drugs), agriculture, rules of origin, rules for state-owned enterprises, and inves-
tor–state arbitration.
The TPP aims at comprehensive market access for its signatories by eliminating 
or reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers across the full spectrum of trade, includ-
ing goods and services. One of the main benefits of the TPP will be the accumula-
tion of origin rules, which may facilitate integration into global supply chains. The 
participating Latin American countries hope that the TPP will provide opportuni-
ties to attract investment and to insert their companies into global value chains 
and, in the case of PA member states, deepen and expand existing regional supply 
chains. Of the PA member countries, Mexico might take most advantage of the TPP 
   6    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 4 | AUGUST 2016 
because it already has a diversified manufacturing sector closely integrated into 
those of other North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. How-
ever, because NAFTA has a higher rule of origin threshold than TPP, the Mexican 
automobile industry could also become exposed to more competition from Asia. 
For the other PA countries, the effect of the TPP may be more limited. Their prin-
cipal export products are commodities and most PA member states already have 
FTAs in force (or they are in the process of negotiating FTAs) with the other TPP 
countries. There might be negative effects for Central American countries with sig-
nificant apparel and textile industries because of increased competition from Viet-
nam. In South America TPP will reinforce the existing divisions between economies 
based on exports and market-oriented growth strategies, on the one hand, and the 
more closed, protected, and state-led economies, on the other hand (Wilson 2015). 
From a broader perspective, with their open economies and free trade agendas, the 
PA countries seem to be better prepared for the challenges of mega-regional trade 
agreements such as TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) (Heine 2016). 
PA: A Strategic Alliance or a Group of Status Seekers?
Although PA member countries share economic interests that are not contingent 
upon their incumbent governments, the same is not true in regard to political stra-
tegic issues. The economic agendas of the Chilean, Colombian, Mexican, and Peru-
vian governments coincide and overlap to a high degree. The four countries are in 
favour of FTAs, an open economy, and closer economic cooperation with Asian and 
Pacific countries. It is remarkable that in all four countries the basic parameters of 
economic policy are not questioned whoever is president.
While they share similar economic interests, the common denominators of the 
PA countries in other issue areas such as security issues are not so clear. Peru and 
Chile still have pending disputes regarding their maritime borders. The Chilean 
government of Michelle Bachelet has a strong South American political agenda. 
And the PA member countries are confronted with different domestic security chal-
lenges (e.g. consolidation of the peace process in Colombia and drug-related crime 
in Mexico). Furthermore, PA countries’ security agendas are determined by the 
(sub)regional context. For instance, Mexico’s security agenda is closely linked to 
that of the United States. In contrast, the three South American PA member states 
have created their own security architecture with the Union of South American Na-
tions (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council at its core. 
Quite interestingly, on one occasion the PA members acted as a coalition at 
an international forum. In August 2015 the Permanent Mission of Colombia at the 
Organization of American States (OAS) requested that a meeting of consultation of 
the ministers of foreign affairs be convened in order to consider “the humanitarian 
situation of Colombian citizens in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in light of 
the recent deportations, which has been brought about by the way in which those 
Colombian citizens are being deported from and forced to leave the Bolivarian Re-
public of Venezuela.” The meeting of the Permanent Council took place on 31 Au-
gust 2015. The request for a meeting of the foreign ministers would have needed 
the support of an absolute majority of the 34 member countries, 18 votes. But it 
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received only 17 votes. However, all the PA countries (4) plus Costa Rica (a PA can-
didate country) voted in favour. Moreover, on 22 June 2016 all four PA countries 
plus both PA candidate states (Costa Rica and Panama) voted in favour (in total 
20 states were in favour; 12 against; and 2 abstained) of discussing in the OAS the 
application of the democracy clause in the case of Venezuela – something the Vene-
zuelan government tried to prevent. 
Nevertheless, one might still question whether the PA is really a strategic al-
liance – that is, whether it is based on common strategic objectives. There are al-
ternative explanations for the objectives PA member countries pursue through the 
alliance. For some, the PA can be interpreted as a “minilateral” instrument of joint 
status-seeking or status enhancement in international politics. Paul, Larson, Paul, 
and Wolforth (2014) define status as “collective beliefs about a given state’s rank-
ing on valued attributes” and argue that “in international politics, status manifests 
itself in two distinct but related ways: as membership in a defined club of actors, 
and as relative standing within such a club.” 
The four PA member countries have created an exclusive free-trader club (only 
countries with a FTA with all member states can join in the future) and “branded” 
the new organisation as an alliance of states with open markets, rule of law, guaran-
teed property rights, and dynamic economies that acts as a gateway to Asia. In a 
nutshell PA members present themselves as the “good guys” or “good economies” 
compared to the “bad guys” or “bad economies” of ALBA and other more state-
oriented Latin American economies. Moreover, the PA members practise a form 
of joint “nation-branding” with the objective of promoting trade and investment. 
From this perspective, the PA cumulates the achievements of the individual coun-
tries with regard to trade liberalisation and FDI-friendly policies. The joint mar-
keting of these accomplishments is the value added of the PA (Levi and Reggiardo 
2016: 200).
A good example of this “branding strategy” is a joint article by the four presi-
dents of the PA countries in the Spanish newspaper El País (8 October 2013) in 
which they declared that their trade agreement constitutes “a robust institutional 
and judicial framework that creates certainty for investments and free trade.” Three 
years later in the Declaration of Puerto Varas (1 July 2016), the presidents of the PA 
countries made reference to the activities of the PA finance ministers “to dissemi-
nate the image of the region as an attractive destiny for investments” and to recog-
nise the contribution they make in consolidating the PA brand (“la marca Alianza 
del Pacifico”). The high number of observer states in the PA can be interpreted as 
an indicator that the PA countries have been successful with their status-seeking 
and branding strategy. 
Only a few months after the PA’s creation, the PA members took the opportuni-
ty at the European Union–Community of Latin America and Caribbean States Sum-
mit in Santiago de Chile (26–27 January 2013) to promote their new alliance and to 
court European investors with the promise of open markets and legal certainty. The 
PA’s advances were well received by the former president of the European Council, 
Herman van Rompuy, who described the PA “as a very promising initiative that 
brings together countries which share the European Union’s views on open mar-
kets and modern economic policies, and which aims at creating an economic space 
similar to our own, based on the four freedoms of circulation of goods, capital, ser-
vices, and persons.” In May 2013 the European Union was a special guest at the PA 
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summit in Cali, Colombia, and in November 2013 government representatives and 
business organisations from PA member countries went on a promotional tour in 
Europe, stopping in Hamburg, Rome, Warsaw, and Helsinki.
During the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2015, 
the presidents of the PA, along with their finance and trade ministers, attended 
an event organised by the Financial Times and the PA Business Council to adver-
tise the investment opportunities their countries can offer. In conjunction with the 
event, the Financial Times also published a special report on investing in PA coun-
tries (28 September 2015). The New York event was initially planned to be the first 
stop of a PA roadshow, but trips to London and Singapore never came to fruition. 
However, the PA member countries have carried out other high-profile joint activi-
ties. For ex ample, on 7 March 2016 the PA members’ finance ministers held a joint 
press conference in New York to highlight common denominators between the four 
countries: fiscal responsibility, clear institutional frameworks, and sound financial 
policies. 
There have also been coordinated activities by the PA countries’ trade-pro-
motion agencies (ProChile, ProColombia, ProMéxico, and PromPerú), such as the 
opening of joint trade-promotion offices in Istanbul (2012) and Casablanca (2013), 
conducting joint presentations at trade fairs in Europe and Asia (especially in the 
food and tourism sectors), holding an annual trade fair called the Pacific Alliance 
Business Matchmaking (Macrorrueda de Negocios de la Alianza del Pacífico) for 
member-country companies (2013 in Cali, Colombia; 2014 in Puerto Vallarta, 
Mexico; 2015 in Paracas, Peru; 2016 in Santiago de Chile, Chile), and organising 
the PA’s first business forum (Day of the Pacific Alliance) in Monterrey, Mexico, in 
March 2016. One should also mention that in October 2015 both the Frankfurt and 
London stock exchanges held a MILA Day, in which representatives of the stock 
exchanges of the four PA countries participated.
While the PA is based on a strategy of joint “nation-branding” and status-seek-
ing, one has to differentiate between the salience the PA has for the four countries. 
The incentives for this joint endeavour are more pronounced in Colombia and Peru 
than in the other two PA countries. Chile has a registered “brand” as a free trader 
and open economy and also complies with high democratic standards. So in the case 
of Chile the affiliation with the PA group is part of an integral strategy to cooperate 
economically with many partners (political cooperation within the PA is less im-
portant). It may also be part of a strategy to join a group of countries with a similar 
“brand” instead of competing against them. In the case of Mexico the political stra-
tegic motives might be more important than the economic and “branding” motives. 
The PA gives Mexico a foothold in South America. As an emerging power it has now 
also created an exclusive club in which it decides on the admission criteria. More-
over, it is a club which discriminates (because of its objectives and membership 
rules) against Brazil and other South American countries. Perhaps Colombia and 
Peru are the countries most interested in the PA as an instrument of status-seeking 
and “nation-branding.” Both countries are members of the languishing Andean 
Community, which has lost appeal for external partners and both are confronted 
with domestic political challenges which, from time to time, have a negative impact 
on how the countries are perceived from the outside. However, both countries also 
have great economic potential and are trying to position themselves in the regional 
context, looking for the right role model to enhance their international status.
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Geopolitical Implications 
What geopolitical implications does the PA have for Latin America and especially 
for South America? Does the PA affect the regional integration and cooperation 
dynamics? From a geopolitical perspective, the PA has generated a new dynamic of 
soft balancing in Latin America. Although the PA excludes Brazil (though this re-
gional power has shown no inclination to join the endeavour), it has revived Mexico 
as an external actor in the South American regional subsystem. Mexico had lost 
its influence in the region in the early 1990s when it shifted its foreign policy pri-
orities to NAFTA. Although Mexico has emphasised the commercial dimension of 
the PA, countries such as Chile and Colombia perceive Mexico’s involvement as an 
opportunity to soft balance Brazil’s influence in South America. From a geopol-
itical perspective, Mexico sees the new alliance as important to it becoming more 
influential in Latin America and South America in particular (Tokatlian 2013). The 
foreign minister highlighted some of these strategic interests in his foreword to the 
PA-focused special issue of Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior published by the 
Mexican Foreign Ministry in the first semester of 2016.
Even though there is an economic bifurcation in South America between free 
trade–oriented countries and more protectionist countries, the risks to regional 
governance might be overstated. For example, the Chilean government of President 
Bachelet argued from the beginning in favour of a process of convergence of the PA 
and Mercosur. In November 2014 the foreign ministers of the Mercosur and the PA 
countries held their first joint meeting in Cartagena, Colombia. During that same 
month, President Bachelet opened the seminar “Diálogo sobre Integración Regional: 
Alianza del Pacífico y Mercosur” (Dialogue on regional integration: Pacific Alliance 
and Mercosur) in Santiago de Chile, which was attended by ministers, political rep-
resentatives, and academics from Mercosur and the PA, as well as by representatives 
of other international organisations, such as the Latin American Integration Asso-
ciation (ALADI), the CAF Development Bank of Latin America, the Inter-American 
 Development Bank (IDB), the OAS, and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) even pre-
sented a study titled “La Alianza del Pacífico y el MERCOSUR. Hacia la convergen-
cia en la diversidad” (The Pacific Alliance and Mercosur. Towards convergence in 
diversity) at the seminar in Santiago de Chile. Since the 47th Mercosur Summit in 
 Paraná (December 2014), all summit declarations have included a statement in fa-
vour of closer cooperation with the PA. In 2015 the Brazilian government also began 
to take a more active stance regarding the rapprochement between the PA and Mer-
cosur, which may be reinforced by the current Brazilian foreign minister, José Serra. 
Moreover, with the election of Mauricio Macri as president of Argentina in Novem-
ber 2015, the Argentinean government has adopted a strong pro-cooperation stance 
(which is in contrast to the country’s position under the former president, Christina 
Fernandez de Kirchner) and even became a PA observer state in 2016. Furthermore, 
President Macri participated as a special guest at the PA summit in Puerto Varas and 
was the keynote speaker at the Third PA Business Summit in Puerto Montt, Chile. 
During his visit to Chile, Macri argued in favour of greater dynamism within Mer-
cosur and the ultimate objective of a convergence of Mercosur and PA (Cué 2016a). 
Despite supporting this approach in principle, President Bachelet prefers a “conver-
gence in diversity” (“la convergencia en la diversidad”) (Cué 2016b).
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These developments demonstrate that the PA has brought “a breath of fresh 
air” to the region (Heine 2016) and has added a new dynamic to South American 
economic integration. The PA could help to advance trade liberalisation. And be-
cause some Mercosur countries are interested in individual FTAs with the PA coun-
tries, the PA could help to subvert the customs union of Mercosur, which could end 
up perforating or even abolishing Mercosur’s common external tariff. Consequent-
ly, the PA is increasing the centrifugal forces within Mercosur. In fact, President 
Macri’s visit to the PA summit in Puerto Varas could be construed as signifying 
that the PA has won the “ideological battle” against Mercosur in regard to the pre-
ferred economic development model in South America and is now luring Mercosur 
countries to join the club. Although neither organisation overlaps in terms of their 
mandates and objectives, they are competing for leadership in Latin America with a 
view to both the regional community and external actors.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, the PA strengthens the Pacific shift in 
South America and the economic link with Asia. Furthermore, it offers the US gov-
ernment new opportunities to promote its free trade agenda in Latin America at a 
time when Washington is showing renewed interest in Latin America. The PA can 
also be seen as part of the geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics that are evolving 
in the Asia-Pacific region (such as TPP) and the great-power competition between 
China and the United States. Likewise, the European Union may obtain more lever-
age in its relations with Latin America through its close cooperation and FTAs with 
the PA countries. This might be helpful in the negotiations for a FTA with Mercosur. 
The PA might put pressure on countries without FTAs with the European Union 
(such as Brazil), especially if EU–US negotiations over the TTIP advance. Such an 
agreement might benefit the PA countries as they already have FTAs with both the 
European Union and the United States. The differentiated multilateral cooperation 
patterns in Latin America open up more access points for external actors such as 
the European Union. The variable geometry of internal and external cooperation 
diminishes the risk of stagnation in interregional relations between Europe and 
Latin America. However, it also makes Latin America more porous with regard to 
external influences.
Outlook
How the PA develops in the midterm will show the real importance of this still 
relatively new alliance and answer the question of whether the PA has been over-
selling its advances and potential. The PA has been a great marketing success, but 
now the customers have to decide whether the product corresponds to their expec-
tations. Moreover, as time passes, even the most successful marketing campaigns 
lose steam. At that point, the product might need a fresh promotion strategy or a 
rebranding. A recent analysis argues that “the greatest challenge for the Pacific Alli-
ance is living up to expectations” (Dade and Meacham 2013: 11). This rings especial-
ly true when it comes to implementing the trade liberalisation agenda – particularly 
regarding the 8 per cent of trade currently still subject to tariffs. Another issue is 
that the PA might be overrated in terms of its economic strength and cooperation 
potential (e.g. intratrade in the PA is quite limited), which could thus make it un-
able to live up to expectations.
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Despite all of this, the PA constitutes an interesting political experiment. It 
demonstrates that middle powers (Mexico) and regional secondary powers (Co-
lombia and Chile) can cooperate and create regional organisations with the ob-
jective to enhance their international status by practising joint nation-branding. 
From this perspective, the PA represents a new type of regional alliance which both 
transcends and challenges traditional regional organisations. With Mexico already 
working with three member states from the South American regional subsystem, 
the potential inclusion of Costa Rica and Panama would see the PA build a bridge 
connecting the South American, Central American, and North American subsys-
tems. Moreover, with its outreach strategy to other regions, especially Asia, the PA 
deviates from traditional regionalism. It is also much more outward oriented than 
“open regionalism” which was in vogue in the 1990s. The PA might be more suitable 
to a multipolar political economy in the international system, where the economic 
and trade-related dimensions of regionalism are becoming less important than the 
political and security dimensions. With regard to trade, many states prefer a cross-
regional strategy (Garzon 2015) based on the diversification of trade partners and 
FTAs with countries in other regions. It will be interesting to see whether other like-
minded governments in other world regions attempt to emulate the PA.
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